

THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTUITION AND LOGICAL REASON IN WESTERN AND EASTERN PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

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Abstract. *The present study aimed to identify the features of the correlation between intuition and logical reason as the cognitive foundations of philosophical thinking in different cultural traditions. Methodologically, conceptual analysis of philosophical notions, thematic interpretation of primary sources, and comparative-philosophical juxtaposition of models were used. The analysis was based on the consistent systematisation of the categories of intuition and logic, the identification of the functions and interrelations within the structure of philosophical cognition, as well as on the comparison of epistemological approaches in different cultural contexts. As a result of the study, it was established that the notions of intuition and logical reason form fundamental supports of philosophical thinking; however, the status, functions, and correlation vary considerably depending on the cultural tradition. In a number of systems, intuition was construed as an autonomous form of knowledge possessing an immediate connection with truth and an inner moral legitimacy. Logical reason, in turn, performed the functions of formalisation, systematisation, and justification, but in several cases was recognised as a derivative of intuitive apprehension. In Eastern conceptions, intuition predominated as a form of spiritual experience and holistic perception, whereas logic was regarded as an instrument for expressing experience already grasped. In Western models, by contrast, logic dominated as a criterion of objectivity and rational certainty, while intuition served as a source of initial impulses or a priori structures. Fundamental differences were identified between dualistic and non-dualistic pictures of cognition, as well as differences in the ethical-political foundations of philosophical systems associated with the priority either of an external rational order or of an inner moral choice. The practical significance of the study consisted in the formation of a theoretical basis for philosophical dialogue between different models of thinking and in the development of cognitive-humanitarian approaches that take into account the plurality of paths to knowledge.*

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1. Introduction

The relevance of the study was conditioned by the insufficient degree of systematic comparison of models of intuition and logical thinking in different cultural-philosophical traditions, in particular in the context of Kyrgyz philosophy. Despite the existing research, it was predominantly limited either to individual authors or to specific philosophical schools. At the same time, an in-depth comparative study in which the Eastern and Western traditions, as well as Kyrgyz philosophy, would be considered within a single analytical field remained unrequested.

The question of the correlation between intuition and logical reason belongs to the number of fundamental problems of philosophical cognition, affecting both the epistemological and ontological foundations of thinking. In contemporary conditions of the transformation of the humanities, the strengthening of interdisciplinary approaches and the emphasis on the cultural specificity of thinking, the study of the interaction of intuitive and rational components in the philosophical systems of the West and the East has acquired theoretical and applied significance. It became necessary to trace not only the conceptual differences, but also the contexts in which intuition and logic performed different epistemological functions.

A number of contemporary authors have turned to the analysis of the worldview foundations and cognitive structures in different cultures. Thus, L.A. Umirzakova et al. (2024) studied mythological thinking as part of the cognitive system, focusing on the dominance of intuitive, symbolic, and metaphorical structures of perceiving reality. The authors showed that mythological thinking functioned as a form of intuitive rationality capable of forming stable mental models mediated by cultural and imagistic components. Continuing the theme of intuitive perception, G.K. Koichumanova (2020) turned to the philosophical aspects of the poetic heritage of Kyrgyz authors. The author's study made it possible to identify in poetry moral-intuitive codes playing an epistemological and ethical role. The author interpreted poetry as a special form of philosophical thinking based on intuitive cognition and inner experience.

The study of the symbolic level of culture as a link between intuition and rationality became the subject of analysis by U. Asanova and A.

Abdurakhmanova (2024). The authors examined how cultural symbols serve as a form of fixation and transmission of intuitive knowledge. Using the example of Kyrgyz culture, it was shown that symbolic structures perform the role of cognitive mediators by which intuition acquires a socially recognisable form. The symbolic content in this model performed the function of integrating personal experience into collective knowledge. The question of intuition in the context of the sustainability of cultural identity received coverage in the work of R.M. Mukasheva (2021). The author studied traditions as the basis for the preservation and reproduction of ethnic values. It was identified that the intuitive assimilation of norms and models of behaviour occurred through ritual and ceremonial forms transmitted intergenerationally. Intuition here appeared as a mechanism of cultural memory, ensuring the inner integrity of the ethos and the stability of its worldview system. The theme of sacred experience was developed in the study by A. Kochkunov (2024), focused on the ritual culture of the Kyrgyz people. At the centre of attention were forms of intuitive apprehension of moral-religious notions such as good, duty, order. The author analysed how ritual actions activate inner mechanisms of the cognition of the sacred through intuitive perception, forming stable images of the ethical and metaphysical structure of the world. Turning to questions of cognitive development, T. Konurbaev et al. (2022) addressed the history of the development of psychological science in Kyrgyzstan. The study touched upon the interaction of rational and irrational components of thinking in the formation of cognitive strategies. The authors analysed how the evolution of scientific thought in psychology contributed to the theoretical comprehension of the balance between logic and intuition in the context of educational and scientific practice.

A philosophical formulation of the problem of intuition and logic within the framework of intercultural synthesis was proposed by C.A. Moore (1951). In the study, the author compared the approaches of Eastern and Western philosophy, focusing on the difference in the understanding of the nature of intuition. The Eastern tradition, according to the author's analysis, construed intuition as a form of unconditional knowledge, whereas Western philosophy more often regarded it as a preliminary stage of rational analysis. The religious-epistemological aspect was analysed by I.B. Siddiqov (2022), who investigated the interrelation between intuition and revelation in the Islamic tradition. The author showed that knowledge obtained through inward insight was regarded as the highest form of truth.

Intuition in this system was interpreted not as an emotional reaction, but as the result of spiritual experience possessing cognitive and ontological significance. The philosophical foundations of logic as a discipline were considered in the work of G. Governatori et al. (2021). The authors described the structure of normative reasoning, including modal and deontic components. The analysis showed that logic as a system was not absolutely formalised: at its base lay flexible and context-sensitive mechanisms. Complementing the spectrum of approaches considered, C.G. Jung et al. (2023) investigated the problem of types of thinking. At the centre of the analysis was the distinction between intuitive and logical thinking as two autonomous cognitive settings. The authors showed that these types determine deep differences in the ways of making sense of experience and in the structures of information processing, which makes it possible to speak of a difference not only in process but also in the aims of cognition.

Despite the significance of the studies listed, a number of gaps were identified. In particular, there was a lack of systematic comparison of Western and Eastern philosophy based on a categorical analysis of intuition and logic. The Kyrgyz philosophical tradition, represented both through folk heritage and through academic works, has not yet been fully included in comparative-philosophical research. The present study filled these gaps by means of a comprehensive approach based on philosophical, comparative-cultural, and cognitive analysis.

The aim of the study consisted of identifying and comparatively analysing models of the interaction of intuition and logical reason in the Western, Eastern, and Kyrgyz philosophical traditions. The objectives of the study included: analysis of the principal philosophical interpretations of the notions of intuition and logical reason, the functions, and correlation; consideration of the particular features of the interpretation of intuition and logic in Western and Eastern philosophy; and undertaking a comparative analysis of the specified models according to epistemological, ontological, ethical, and politico-philosophical criteria.

2. Materials and Methods

The study relied on a systematic examination of primary sources in which the concepts of intuition and logical reason were consistently and convincingly presented within the Western and Eastern philosophical traditions, including the Kyrgyz sources represented within these

traditions. As the material base, nine key texts were selected, covering different epochs and cultural contexts. The choice of sources was determined by the theoretical significance, the representativeness with respect to the dominant epistemological, ontological, and ethical-political attitudes of the respective traditions, and the level of philosophical elaboration of the notions of intuition and logical reason. Exclusion criteria were texts of a predominantly literary-artistic, theological, or fragmentary character, as well as works in which no systematic philosophical reflection on the specified categories was traceable.

The Western philosophical line was represented by the works *Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies* by R. Descartes (2008), *Critique of Pure Reason* by I. Kant (1781), and *Creative Evolution* by H. Bergson (1911). These texts provided the theoretical basis for the reconstruction of three models of the correlation between intuition and logic: subordination, coordination, and inversion. The analysis of each work envisaged a detailed study of the conceptual apparatus, as well as the identification of the role of intuition and logic in the formation of the structure of knowledge, with reliance on fragments of the original texts and the philosophical context.

The Eastern philosophical perspective was considered through the works *Pramanavartika* by A. Dharmakīrti (2015) and *An Inquiry into the Good* by K. Nishida (1990), chosen for the fundamental contribution to the development of Buddhist and Japanese philosophy. These sources made it possible to investigate non-dual models of cognition in which intuition not only preceded logic but also constituted the basis of ontological self-awareness. Particular attention was paid to the treatment of the categories *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, as well as to the notion of “pure experience” as the unity of the ontic and the cognitive act. The philosophical thought of Kyrgyzstan was analysed based on four texts: *History of Philosophy in Kyrgyzstan* (Kakeev, 2012), the texts of Nurmoldo’s *sanats* from the textbook *Kyrgyz Literature: Textbook for 10th Grade of Secondary Schools* (Asanaliev and Baigaziev, 2007), *Theory of a Pure State* (Musabaev, 2024), and *Traditions of Social and Philosophical Thought in the Spiritual Culture of the Kyrgyz People* (Mukasov, 1999). These sources were selected as authentic expressions of a local epistemology oriented towards intuitive-moral knowledge and culturally conditioned forms of logical thinking.

Methodologically, the study relied on a comprehensive approach combining conceptual analysis, thematic interpretation, discursive

reconstruction, and comparative-philosophical juxtaposition. First, the principal conceptual contours characterising intuition and logical reason in each of the philosophical systems were systematised, taking into account the terminological specificity and contextual meanings. Next, the identified models were compared on four grounds: epistemological (typology of cognition, mechanisms of verification and the structure of knowledge), ontological (the metaphysical model of reality, the status of the subject), functional (the configuration of logic and intuition within the philosophical discourse) and ethics-political (the normative foundations of morality, the structure of authority and the ideal of social order).

All stages of the study were directed towards identifying not only differences but also possible zones of intersection between the traditions, to develop a generalised approach to the notion of philosophical thinking as a form of integration of the rational and the intuitive.

3. Results

3.1. The notions of intuition and logical reason

The problem of the interaction of intuition and logical reason occupies an important place in philosophical knowledge, forming the basis of epistemological and ontological conceptions. These two forms of cognition were often considered opposite in nature, yet at the same time, attempts at the mutual complementarity or integration were observed in various philosophical systems. The study of the categories of intuition and logical reason makes it possible not only to trace the history of the development of philosophical views on the nature of thinking but also to identify the deep differences in the models of knowledge construction characteristic of different cultural-philosophical traditions. This section is aimed at systematising the notions of intuition and logic as epistemological and ontological categories, as well as at analysing the functional correlation in the construction of philosophical models of the world.

Intuition in the philosophical tradition was construed as a special mode of cognition not mediated by discursive operations and not reducible to logical constructions. In the epistemological aspect, intuition was defined as the capacity for the immediate apprehension of truth, bypassing sequential reasoning. Ontologically, intuition was regarded as a form of the subject's participation in the essential structure of being, that is, as an act in which the subject and the object of knowledge are in a state of inseparable presence. Intuitive knowledge was described as holistic, indivisible, and

immediate, while being capable of generating inner conviction without recourse to external proofs. Classical philosophy connected intuition with the starting point of cognition, the source of primary axioms and self-evidences. In different schools, intuition received different interpretations: from the Platonic anamnesis, which presupposes the soul's recollection of truth, to the Kantian understanding of sensible intuition as a form of spatial-temporal contemplation. In later philosophy, especially in the context of phenomenology and intuitionism, intuition often acquired the status of an autonomous channel for perceiving the essential structures of phenomena. Thus, intuition represented a mode of cognition possessing specific ontological and epistemological legitimacy distinct from rational reasoning (Sellke, 2024).

Logical reason appeared in philosophy as the opposite of intuitive knowledge, embodying sequence, analyticity, and the formalizability of thinking. Its principal function consisted of constructing systems of knowledge based on the principles of non-contradiction, deductive justification, and verifiability. Within the classical rationalist tradition, logical reason was regarded as a universal instrument of cognition capable of ensuring the objectivity and reproducibility of knowledge. The structure of logical reason includes the basic cognitive operations – induction, deduction, abstraction, generalisation, and classification – which provide the analytical processing of information. Cognition is achieved through language, formalised categories, and systems of concepts that make it possible to model reality and to fix logical connections between phenomena (Figure 1).

Logical reason serves as an instrument for the systematisation and verification of knowledge, providing a rational description and interpretation of reality. Its cognitive and linguistic mechanisms form the basis for the construction of philosophical and scientific conceptions, in which knowledge is presented in a logically ordered and reproducible form. The formation of logical thinking in the European tradition relates to the development of formal logic, from Aristotle to the symbolic logic of the twentieth century. The development of the scientific method, methodological rationalism, and the logical reconstruction of knowledge made logical reason the principal epistemological foundation in Western philosophy. Thus, logical reason acquired the status of a system-forming mechanism of philosophical and scientific cognition.




Figure 1. The structure of logical reason in philosophical cognition

Source: compiled by the author based on A. Nes et al. (2023), P. Ellerton (2022), J. Peregrin and V. Svoboda (2023).

Relations between intuition and logical reason in the history of philosophy developed along three principal lines: opposition, complementarity, and subordination. In the model of opposition, intuition and logic were considered mutually exclusive ways of cognition. Thus, logic affirmed truth through proof and sequential analysis, whereas intuition affirmed it in the form of an immediate “vision” of essence. In this model, one type of knowledge was often declared unreliable or subjective. The model of complementarity presupposed that intuition and logic do not exclude each other but perform different, though mutually complementary, functions. Intuition in this context played the role of the initial impulse, the source of hypotheses or axioms, whereas logic provided the verification, formalisation, and systematisation. Such a position received development in the philosophy of science, in particular in interpretations of creative thinking, where intuition was considered a catalyst for scientific discoveries. In the model of subordination, one component – as a rule, logic – was declared dominant, and intuition was construed either as a preliminary stage of rational thinking or as an insufficiently justified form of cognition. However, in a number of Eastern philosophies and religious-philosophical systems, by contrast, intuition received the status of the

highest form of cognition, whereas logic was regarded as a limited means of interpreting reality. Thus, the model of the correlation between intuition and logic proved context-dependent and varied according to the cultural and philosophical tradition (Ghasemi et al., 2022).

Intuition and logic not only functioned as modes of cognition but also formed the foundation for the construction of various philosophical ontologies. In rationalist systems, logical reason became not merely an instrument but the basis of an ontology in which being was interpreted as a logically organised structure. Thus, the universe within such systems was regarded as amenable to rational explanation, and philosophy strove for the formalisation of the whole of reality. By contrast, in philosophical traditions oriented towards intuition, the picture of the world was constructed as a living, fluid, and indivisible stream of being, accessible not to logic but to inner contemplation. Intuition in this case became a means of existential and spiritual participation in reality. Such approaches are especially characteristic of Eastern philosophy, phenomenology, and intuitionist currents, where the subject of cognition is not separated from the object but intuitively apprehends the structure of the world as a whole. Thus, the choice between intuition and logical reason in philosophy proved to be not only epistemological but also ontological. On the dominance of one or the other form of thinking depended the representation of the nature of being, the structure of the subject, the form of truth, and the limits of knowledge. This makes the correlation between intuition and logic a key element in the construction of the philosophical picture of the world, determining both the methodology and the content of philosophical analysis.

The analysis carried out of the notions of intuition and logical reason made it possible to delineate the fundamental directions in the philosophical comprehension of the nature of knowledge. Intuition, as the immediate apprehension of truth, and logic, as a rational system of analysis and justification, represent two autonomous but potentially interacting channels of cognition. The historically conditioned opposition is being replaced by contemporary attempts at integration within intercultural and interdisciplinary models. Understanding intuition and logical reason as philosophical categories makes it possible to investigate more deeply not only the cognitive mechanisms of thinking but also the ways of constructing worldview systems, which becomes the basis for the

subsequent comparative analysis within the Western, Eastern, and Kyrgyz philosophical traditions.

3.2. Approaches of Eastern and Western philosophy to intuition and logical reason

The study of the notions of intuition and logical reason in the context of various philosophical traditions requires reliance on authoritative sources in which these categories were developed at a systematic level. Within Western philosophy, special significance is acquired by the interpretation of intuition as an epistemological instance connected with the certainty of knowledge, and of logical reason as the principal instrument for constructing cognitive structures. At the same time, approaches to the correlation of these two forms of cognition varied substantially from epoch to epoch and from author to author.

Within the Western philosophical tradition, the correlation of intuition and logical reason was considered a key question of gnoseology and metaphysics. Intuition in this context was understood not as an irrational premonition, but as an immediate apprehension of truth that precedes formal thinking. Logical reason, in turn, was associated with the analytical processing of the content of knowledge and the provision of its justification. These differences receive differing interpretations in the philosophical systems of R. Descartes, I. Kant, and H. Bergson, each of whom laid down their own structure of the correlation between the intuitive and the rational.

In *Meditations on First Philosophy* by R. Descartes (2008), the act of radical doubt was placed at the foundation of the entire philosophical construction, the aim of which was the discovery of a certain beginning of knowledge. This beginning becomes the intuitive self-evident assertion *cogito ergo sum*, not derived logically but given directly in the experience of thinking. Intuition in Descartes represents an act of intellection in which truth is grasped without intermediate inference. Descartes defines it as the capacity for “clear and distinct” perception – a criterion ensuring the certainty of a priori knowledge. At the same time, logical reason in R. Descartes performs an auxiliary function: through deductive reasoning, it extends certainty from the initial intuition to more complex theoretical constructions. Thus, logic is not primary but serves as an instrument for the formulation and dissemination of intuitive truths. This establishes a model

of subordination in which intuition occupies the highest position as the source of truth, and logical reason, as the means of its justified explication.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* by I. Kant (1781), a principled distinction is drawn between sensible intuition (*Anschauung*) and the activity of the understanding (*Verstand*), which constitutes the basis of the transcendental theory of cognition. In Kant's system, intuition is the form of sensibility through which objects are given to the subject. It is possible thanks to the a priori forms – space and time – which are not borrowed from experience but precede it as the conditions of the possibility of sensible perception. In contrast, logical reason is presented as the active component of thinking, affecting the synthesis of the data of sensibility with the help of the categories. Knowledge arises not from intuition alone but as a result of the interaction of sensible data with the a priori concepts of the understanding. Here, a special role is played by synthetic a priori judgements, in which I. Kant saw the possibility of extending knowledge without recourse to empirical data, relying only on the inner structures of reason. This construction does not oppose intuition and logic but differentiates the functions: intuition supplies the material, and logic (in the person of the understanding and reason) gives it form. Thus, I. Kant offers a model of coordination: neither element can be excluded without the loss of full cognition.

In contrast to the analytical constructions of R. Descartes and I. Kant, H. Bergson (1911) in *Creative Evolution* proposes a different interpretation of the correlation between intuition and logic, based on the distinction between static and dynamic knowledge. Intuition, in the author's conception, is the capacity for immediate entering into the object, apprehending it as living, fluid, and changing. It is directed not at the fixation of what is, but at the grasp of becoming, which eludes logical analysis. H. Bergson opposes intuition to rational analysis, considering that logic dismembers, abstracts, and thereby distorts living reality. Whereas logical thinking operates with concepts that separate the object from time, intuition penetrates its duration (*durée*), revealing the inner dynamics of being. Thus, in the Bergsonian model, logic loses its priority in cognition, yielding precedence to intuition as the means of genuine philosophical penetration into the essence of life. However, in this construction, intuition does not reject reason but compensates for its limitations, offering a different direction of apprehension.

A comparison of the three approaches presented shows the diversity of models of interaction between intuition and logical reason. In R. Descartes (2008), intuition is the initial act upon which the rational construction of knowledge rests; logic is merely the form of its unfolding. In I. Kant (1781), intuition and logic act as equal but strictly differentiated elements of cognition, not replacing but complementing one another. In H. Bergson (1911), on the contrary, intuition restores the lost integrity of perception, disrupted by logical dismemberment, and thereby becomes the highest form of philosophical apprehension.

Eastern philosophical thought, unlike Western, was formed in the context of non-dual ontologies, where knowledge was not rigidly divided into subject and object but was apprehended as an experience of wholeness. Intuition in Eastern systems was often recognised not only as a legitimate but also as the highest means of cognition. Logical reason, in turn, was considered a conditional, instrumental level of thinking, subordinated or conjoined to inner experience. These attitudes are traceable in Indian logic (*Pramāṇavārttika*), Japanese philosophy of the early twentieth century, and the Kyrgyz traditional thought that goes back to an epic and ethics-poetic form of knowledge.

In *Pramāṇavārttika* (2015) by A. Dharmakīrti, a structure of cognition was formulated based on two forms of reliable knowledge: *pratyakṣa* (immediate perception) and *anumāna* (inference). *Pratyakṣa* was construed as an intuitive form of knowledge arising without the mediation of language or conceptual categories. Its source was pure sensory or mental contact with the object. In Buddhist epistemology, such a form was considered the most reliable, since it was not distorted by cognitive constructions. *Anumāna*, by contrast, represented a logical operation based on inference, applied to already mediated data. Despite the recognition of the significance of *anumāna*, A. Dharmakīrti emphasised that its truth always rested on prior intuitive perception, which indicates the epistemological priority of *pratyakṣa*. Such a model describes hierarchical interaction: logic is admissible and useful, but derivative in relation to the immediate, intuitive apprehension of reality, which is the condition for the emergence of reliable knowledge.

Continuing the line of intuitive thinking, K. Nishida (1990) in *An Inquiry into the Good* develops the concept of “pure experience”, where the act of cognition is affected outside the opposition of subject and object. Intuition in the author’s system is not feeling and not empirical perception,

but an act of self-awareness arising at the moment of the coincidence of knowledge and being. Such intuition does not rely on logical operability; it structures inner experience as the apprehension of truth in which thinking and object are one. In this philosophy, logical reason acquires a secondary character: it represents a reflective form arising post factum, after the holistic intuitive act. K. Nishida does not deny logic but integrates it into a broader metaphysical horizon, where logical thinking is a means of explication of intuitive content already given. Thus, K. Nishida's model demonstrates a non-dual understanding of cognition in which logic and intuition are not opposed but are distinguished by the level of ontological depth.

Of particular interest is the Kyrgyz philosophical tradition, formed predominantly in an oral culture and reflected in texts that appeared in written form only in the twentieth to twenty-first centuries. In the collection *History of Philosophy in Kyrgyzstan* by A. Ch. Kakeev (2012), the specificity of the Kyrgyz worldview is identified as synthetic, imagistic, and morally oriented. The author emphasises that in traditional Kyrgyz culture, knowledge was not divided into rational and irrational, but existed in the form of wisdom, including both logical observations and intuitive-moral generalisations. In the author's view, intuition was manifested in metaphorical thinking, ethnocultural symbols, and aphoristic judgements. Logical reason was also present, but in the form of everyday logic directed not at abstract constructions but at the resolution of practical and ethical situations. Thus, the Kyrgyz tradition shows an example of the functional synthesis of intuitive and logical components, not subordinated to a common epistemological hierarchy but coexisting within the structure of collective mentality.

Supplementing these positions, the texts of Nurmoldo demonstrate a poetic form of expressing intuitive-moral knowledge (Asanaliev and Baigaziev, 2007). In the *sanats* (poetic sayings), moral parables and aphoristic formulae predominate, constructed on contextual analogies and symbolic images. These texts carry a worldview intuition – not as an abstraction but as a culturally transmitted experience. Logical structure within these texts is subordinated to rhythm, analogy, and ethical content rather than to deductive orderliness. This indicates the predominance of intuition as a form of wisdom transmitted through artistic forms. In the context of this corpus, one may speak of a cultural epistemology, where

intuitive knowledge is not only individual but also collectively fixed and reproduced through artistic-verbal practices.

The conception presented in the work *Theory of a Pure Stat* by M. Musabaev (2024) represents an attempt to construct a philosophical model of the moral renewal of society on the basis of intuitively perceived ethics. The author considers intuition as the foundation of moral action, independent of external norms and formal categories. Unlike the traditional logical-legal interpretation of the state, M. Musabaev proposes to see its foundation in the human capacity for inner moral choice, which is affected intuitively, through conscience and a sense of justice. Logical reason in this model plays a secondary role, ensuring the interpretation and dissemination of moral orientations, but is not the source. In such an approach, intuition acquires a politico-philosophical dimension, becoming a condition of the transformation of the social order.

Completing the picture of Kyrgyz philosophical thought is the work *Traditions of Social and Philosophical Thought in the Spiritual Culture of the Kyrgyz People* by M. Mukasov (1999), in which emphasis is placed on the development of the rational tradition in the scientific and educational context. Unlike the authors mentioned earlier, Saliev focuses on logical reason as an instrument of systematic thinking necessary for the analysis of social, cultural, and educational processes. The author describes the formation of a conceptual apparatus, the development of logic-philosophical schools, and the growth of interest in formalised methods of reasoning in the post-Soviet period. At the same time, the author does not deny the significance of intuitive thinking but considers it primarily as a source of heuristic ideas embedded within the logical system of knowledge. Thus, the author's approach shows how logical reason became a conscious object of philosophical reflection in the Kyrgyz scholarly tradition.

The concepts presented by Eastern philosophy reveal a difference in epistemological strategies compared with the Western tradition. In Indian logic, intuition and logic correlate as primary and derivative; in Japanese philosophy, as profound experience and its conceptual explication; in Kyrgyz thought, as a syncretic form of cultural knowledge. Unlike Western models oriented towards the formal structure of cognition, Eastern approaches include intuition as an integral part of existential experience and cultural self-identification.

Different philosophical traditions have interpreted the correlation between intuition and logical reason in different ways. In Western thought,

three models were identified: subordination (Descartes, 2008), coordination (Kant, 1781), and hierarchical inversion (Bergson, 1911), each of which formed the structure of cognition in its own way. Eastern approaches, by contrast, were oriented towards non-dual epistemologies in which intuition was considered the primary means of apprehending truth, and logic – a secondary instrument of interpretation. Indian, Japanese, and Kyrgyz philosophies demonstrated models in which intuition was integrated into the cultural, moral, and ontological structure of thought, emphasising its priority in the formation of holistic knowledge.

3.3 Comparison of epistemological and ontological approaches of the East and West

A comparison of Western and Eastern philosophical traditions by the parameters of intuition and logical reason makes it possible to identify not only differences in epistemological and ontological attitudes but also the features of the functional distribution of the roles of these cognitive mechanisms in the construction of philosophical knowledge. Such a comparative approach makes it possible to identify culturally conditioned forms of rationality and to assess the potential for integration in contemporary interdisciplinary and philosophical models of thinking.

The epistemological level shows how philosophical traditions determine the nature and sources of reliable knowledge. In Western thought, intuition is most often considered an initial but limited means, whereas the Eastern tradition accords it a deeper status (Table 1).

Table 1. Epistemological differences

Philosophical tradition	Approach to intuition	Role of logical reason
Western	Intuition – a means of apprehension limited by logical thinking (Descartes, 2008; Kant, 1781; Bergson, 1911)	The principal instrument of justification and construction of knowledge
Eastern	Intuition – an equivalent or priority means of cognition, especially in ethics and spirituality (Dharmakīrti, 2015; Nishida, 1990)	An auxiliary, conditional or derivative element in relation to intuition

Source: compiled by the author.

Western philosophy emphasises the priority of logical thinking as an instrument of analysis and systematisation of knowledge, whereas intuition is more often considered an auxiliary or initial stage of cognition. The Eastern tradition, by contrast, asserts intuition as a full or even primary means of apprehension – especially in the spiritual, ethical, and ontological spheres. This manifests the difference between the analytical approach of the West and the holistic, non-dual thinking of the East.

Ontological attitudes determine the representation of being and the structure of the subject. Western philosophy accentuates the distinction between subject and object, whereas Eastern thought strives for non-duality (Table 2).

Table 2. Ontological foundations

Philosophical tradition	Ontological model	Examples
Western	Dualism: subject-object, mind-body, logic-intuition	R. Descartes (2008) (dualism of body and mind), I. Kant (1781) (differentiation of forms of cognition)
Eastern	Wholeness: unity of being, self-awareness, interpenetration	K. Nishida (1990) (pure experience), Kyrgyz thought (ethical unity), Buddhism (non-duality)

Source: compiled by the author.

Thus, Eastern philosophy proceeds from representations of the holistic nature of reality and the inclusion of the subject within being, rather than the separation from the object of cognition. Unlike the Western tradition, which accentuates distance, analysis, and structuredness, Eastern thought strives for the experience of unity, harmony, and inner apprehension. This determines the priority of intuition as a form of contact with truth, whereas logic is regarded as its auxiliary or derivative instrument.

At the same time, within the Eastern tradition, the Kyrgyz philosophy demonstrates a number of specific features. Its ontology is focused not so much on metaphysical non-duality as on the ethical inclusion of the subject in the world, realised through moral categories and images. Epistemologically, Kyrgyz thought is based on intuitive-moral wisdom expressed in poetic, aphoristic, and symbolic forms, where truth is perceived through inner resonance with collective memory and the way of

life. This distinguishes it from more abstract Eastern models, such as Buddhist or Daoist epistemology, which rely on universal transcendental categories. The Kyrgyz tradition, while remaining part of the Eastern discourse, represents a culturally conditioned form of holistic knowledge based on intuition, ethics, and the imagistic structure of thinking (Asanaliev and Baigaziev, 2007).

Functional differences between intuition and logic determine how each tradition builds a system of cognition. The Western approach often reduces intuition to a starting point, whereas the Eastern approach considers it an all-embracing path (Table 3).

Table 3. Functions of intuition and logic

Philosophical tradition	Function of intuition	Function of logic
Western	Initial impulse or auxiliary means	Verification, systematisation and formulation of knowledge
Eastern	The true beginning and completion of the path of apprehension	Interpretation and accompaniment of inner experience

Source: compiled by the author.

The ethical and political dimensions demonstrate how philosophical approaches to reason and intuition form not only epistemological constructions but also real models of social order, moral orientations, and value practices. The attitude to intuition and logic in different traditions influences notions of justice, norms of behaviour, foundations of authority, and the role of the individual in society (Table 4).

Table 4. Ethics-political aspect

Philosophical tradition	Fundamentals of social philosophy	Examples
Western	Legal, rationally organised order	Legal system, rational state
Eastern	Intuitive-moral orientations and spiritual values	Theory of a pure state (Musabaev, 2024), sanats of Nurmoldo

Source: compiled by the author.

Whereas the Western tradition places emphasis on law, rational arguments, and formal institutions as the basis of social order, the Eastern is oriented towards inner morality, spiritual maturity, and the intuitive

regulation of behaviour. In such models, moral behaviour is determined not so much by external laws as by an inner sense of justice, conscience, and harmony with the world. This difference sets different trajectories for the formation of ethics-political systems and modes of social integration.

The question of the possibility of synthesising Western and Eastern philosophical approaches to intuition and logical reason acquires particular relevance in conditions of the rapid transformation of contemporary knowledge, where both analytical rigour and the depth of inner experience are in demand. The Western tradition offers a powerful toolkit of logical analysis, theory-building, formalisation of concepts, and argumentation. The Eastern draws attention to the wholeness of perception, the intuitive penetration into the essence of phenomena, non-dual thinking, and the moral self-organisation of the subject. These approaches developed independently for a long time, but in modern times, the mentioned approaches have become the basis for the search for a more integral model of thinking. The union of Western rationality and Eastern intuitive depth does not imply a simple mechanical combination of concepts, but requires the identification of functional compatibility. For example, logic may be used to systematise intuitive insights, and intuition, as a source of heuristic ideas and moral orientations not encompassed by pure rationality. In such an approach, logical reason does not negate intuition but acts within the bounds established by it, becoming an instrument of its explication. Intuition, in turn, is not isolated from analysis but gains the possibility of being articulated, transmitted, and critically comprehended.

The differences considered between Western and Eastern philosophical systems attest to the existence of two complementary types of thinking: the analytical, relying on logical sequence and objectivity, and the intuitive, expressing inner wholeness and moral orientation. The union of these models is possible based on the recognition of the multidimensionality of cognitive experience and the value of both rational and trans-rational forms of perception. Such a synthesis may contribute to the construction of a more complete and more universal philosophical picture of the human being and the world.

4. Discussion

The correlation between intuition and logical thinking has been considered both in classical philosophy and in contemporary cognitive, epistemological, and cultural studies. In the academic literature, attention

has focused on the features of intuitive knowledge, the structure of logical inference, the role of sensory and experiential components in cognition, as well as on the cultural and trans-civilisational aspects of thought. The works of contemporary researchers have made it possible to record stable trends in the interpretation of these categories, to identify new methodological approaches, and to expand the understanding of the functions within cognitive and philosophical systems.

Of particular significance was the study by A. Tamura (2023), which analysed the structure of the differences between the notions of *intuitus*, *intelligentia*, and *experientia* in R. Descartes. Contrary to the traditional interpretation of intuition as purely a priori and rational, A. Tamura identified the presence of empirically conditioned intuition, closely linked to the individual life experience of the subject. This made it possible to clarify that, within Western thought, intuition is not a homogeneous category but includes different levels and forms – from the rational a priori to the empirical-situational. Nevertheless, the results of this study advanced this position by recording that, in the Eastern philosophical tradition, intuition is understood as a universal, non-dual, and transcendental foundation of thought, rather than as a derivative of cognitive activity. J. Browning (2023) developed a similar theme by examining in I. Kant addresses the problem of the determinacy of intuition within the structure of transcendental cognition. The author established that Kantian intuition is not reducible to empirical perception but is organised according to the a priori forms of sensibility – space and time – which confer determinacy upon it and make possible the synthesis of experience. This complemented the results of the present work, which emphasised a coordination model of interaction between intuition and logic in Kant's system, in which neither form of cognition is dominant. Nevertheless, the study expanded this understanding by indicating that, in Eastern philosophy, apriority is constructed not as a structure of form but as the immediate experience of the unity of consciousness and being, indivisible into subject and object.

The work of T.-L. Yeung (2022), comparing the ideas of I. Kant, K. Nishida, and Mou, were particularly relevant in the context of an intercultural analysis of the notions of intellectual intuition. In the study, intuition was considered as a point of convergence of the metaphysical foundations of different traditions of thought, demonstrating that, despite differences in terminology and methodology, Western and Eastern

philosophies strive to express non-discursive knowledge as a source of genuine ontological clarity. This largely intersected with the conclusion of the present study concerning the non-dual nature of the Eastern approach. However, the comparison undertaken additionally made it possible to identify not only similarities in the conceptual foundations but also a fundamental difference in the functions: in the Western model, intuition serves the structuring of sensory experience, whereas in the Eastern one, it permeates the ontological foundation as well as ethical and spiritual practice.

The development of Buddhist epistemology in the interpretation of J. Taber (2022) confirmed the priority of the form of immediate perception (*pratyakṣa*) in the structure of cognition in A. Dharmakīrti. The author convincingly demonstrated that logical inference (*anumāna*) does not function as an autonomous source of knowledge but is integrated into the system as a derivative and instrumental structure operating within the bounds of truths already grasped intuitively. These positions proved conceptually consonant with the hierarchical inversion model identified in the study, where intuition determines the conditions of cognitive validity of logical judgment. However, the study supplemented this understanding by clarifying the limits of applicability of logical inference in Eastern systems: it does not possess a universal status, as in the Western tradition, but is limited to the function of secondary articulation of intuitively given transcendental contents.

The reflections of D. Neshet (2021), who interprets epistemic logic as a cognitive reflection of experiential contact with reality, emphasised the necessity of an inseparable link between logical reasoning and empirical perception. The author's approach was based on the recognition of experience as the fundamental premise of all knowledge and logical operation, which ensured the validity of rational constructions through the correlation with reality. This position largely accords with a number of Eastern concepts, where intuition is also closely connected with the experience of the world, but is distinguished by a deeper ontological scope. Whereas in the Western paradigm logic acts as the rational continuation of experience, in the Eastern tradition, intuition precedes and includes experience as a manifestation of being. Thus, the study clarified that logic and intuition occupy in these traditions not merely different cognitive positions but are embedded in opposing ontological foundations.

The study by M.H. Fischer (2023) on embodied cognition emphasised the key role of corporeality, environment, and practical context in the formation of cognitive mechanisms. According to this approach, thinking does not constitute an isolated mental operation but is realised through bodily interaction with the surrounding world, in which cognition is formed and rooted. This idea proved methodologically and substantively close to the Kyrgyz philosophical tradition, where intellectual and intuitive acts grow through the experience of everyday life, customs, and bodily participation in the world. Within the present study, this similarity made it possible to interpret intuition not only as a mental but also as a bodily-cultural experience, inseparably connected with action and context. This made it possible to reconceptualise intuition from a functional perspective as a form of active presence in the world.

M. Raoelison et al. (2021), in the empirical study of cognitive development, showed that even strictly logical inferences in childhood and adulthood are based on implicit intuitive processes. The work revealed the dependence of formal thinking on pre-rational structures functioning outside full awareness, which accords with the assertion of the profound role of intuition in cognitive architecture. These findings correlated with the position of the present study on the primacy of intuition in relation to logic. However, this philosophical study advanced the understanding of this relationship by indicating that, in Eastern traditions, intuition is regarded not only as a source but also as a norm – it forms the criteria for distinguishing truth, goodness, and reality, including the ontological and ethical validity of rational structures.

The work of M. Winstanley (2022) demonstrated that the psychological structure of reasoning is not static and universal but is formed depending on cognitive expectations, prior experience, and culturally mediated perceptual schemas. This made it possible to consider logical thinking as variable and adaptive, embedded in the specific context of reasoning. Within the present study, this perspective was further developed: it was shown that, in Eastern philosophy, logic does not act as a universal tool of analysis but functions as a derivative of intuitive and existential perception of the world. Unlike the Western model, where logic retains autonomy, in the Eastern system, it acquires significance only when rooted in spiritual-practical experience. This confirmed the cultural conditioning of the logical apparatus.

The study by H. Bronkhorst et al. (2020) showed that there is a significant divergence between the structure of formal logic and the real mechanisms of everyday thinking. The authors concluded that logical models constructed on strict rules of deduction are insufficient to explain cognitive processes occurring in the natural environment. An adaptation of logic to the cultural-situational context is necessary, allowing the consideration of factors of intuitive decision-making and the socio-moral conditioning of judgements. This approach proved especially significant in light of the analysis of the Kyrgyz philosophical tradition, in which logical thinking is not abstracted from practice but embedded in a system of moral coordinates. The study confirmed that logic and intuition in such a model are not opposed but act as complementary mechanisms of culturally conditioned cognition.

The aspect of symbolic logic, recorded in the poetic and ethically charged texts of Kyrgyz philosophy, manifested itself particularly vividly in the analysis of the *sanats* of Nurmoldo, where thought is expressed through metaphor, aphoristic form, and imagistic structure. From this point of view, the work of H. Schmidtke (2021), devoted to the logic of context, proved highly relevant. The author proposed an approach according to which logical reasoning does not necessarily follow linear or universal rules, but may be constructed on variable meanings and associative transitions characteristic of non-local thinking. Such a model proved consonant with those forms of knowledge that are formed outside formal logical-semantic structures yet possess internal coherence – it is precisely this kind of logic that the texts of Nurmoldo possess, where logical orderliness is manifested through moral-semantic coherence. This confirmed the conclusion that intuitive knowledge can have a logical form different from classical structures and requires a rethinking of the bounds of rationality in philosophical analysis.

An important confirmation of the thesis of the present study regarding the possibility of synthesising intuition and logic was provided by the conclusions of B. Santangelo and M. Kryjevskaja (2023). Within cognitive psychology, the authors identified the necessity of integrating intuitive and rational mechanisms of thinking to achieve high cognitive efficiency. This accorded with how, in the present study, the potential for uniting Western analytical rigour with Eastern holistic intuition was described. Not only was the compatibility of these approaches emphasised,

but also the possibility of creating a new model of thinking based on the mutual support of cognitive strategies.

Taken together, the studies considered confirmed the relevance of the theme of the interaction of intuition and logic, both from the philosophical and from the cognitive perspective. The present study made it possible not only to systematise various approaches but also to offer a structural comparison on the basis of epistemological, ontological, and ethics-political criteria, clarifying the limits of applicability of logical and intuitive thinking in a trans-philosophical context.

5. Conclusions

In the course of the study, it was established that the categories of intuition and logical reason performed fundamentally different functions within the Western and Eastern philosophical traditions. Intuition in the Western context was considered predominantly as a form of immediate apprehension, serving either as a starting point for subsequent rational analysis or as a means of going beyond formal logic in the pursuit of non-discursive knowledge. Logical reason in this case performed the function of systematisation, deduction, and verification, ensuring the justification and structure of knowledge.

It was revealed that, within the Western model, an approach prevailed in which intuition and logic stood in a hierarchical or coordinated relationship, but with the dominant role of logical structure as a universal instrument of philosophical thinking. Knowledge was conceived as the result of the cognitive processing of sensory or intuitive material subject to rational reflection.

In contrast, in the Eastern tradition, intuition was understood as an independent and complete mode of cognition, associated with holistic experience, moral discernment, and a non-dual perception of being. Logical reason, although acknowledged, was interpreted predominantly as a derivative and limited mechanism, admissible within the bounds of an already given intuitive whole. Such an approach proceeded from the impossibility of a fully rational description of experience connected with spiritual depth, ethical intuition, and the ontological inclusion of the subject within the structure of reality.

A comparative analysis made it possible to identify systemic differences in the interpretation of intuition and logic along four lines:

1. In the epistemological aspect, the Western tradition emphasised formalised rationality, whereas the Eastern – intuitive immediacy as the basis of reliability. Thus, intuition in Eastern thought acted not as auxiliary but as the determining cognitive instance.

2. In the ontological aspect, the difference consisted in the opposition between dualism and wholeness.

3. In the functional aspect, logic in the Western system acted as a means of structuring, whereas in the Eastern – as an instrument for the explication of already lived knowledge.

4. In the ethics-political aspect, differences were identified between a normative-legal order grounded in logical argumentation and a moral regulation of behaviour connected with intuitive evaluation and cultural tradition. Eastern, and especially Kyrgyz, concepts rely on intuitive-moral orientations, where moral behaviour is determined by an inner sense of justice, conscience, and the proportionality of cultural tradition.

Thus, the categories of intuition and logical reason appear not as universal and unchangeable forms of thinking, but as cognitively paradigmatic constructs determined by culture and philosophy. A comparison of Western analytical rationality and Eastern intuitive depth makes it possible not only to delineate the boundaries of traditional epistemological systems, but also to indicate prospects for the mutual complementarity.

A limitation of the present study lies in its focus on theoretical texts and philosophical concepts, without recourse to empirical data or interdisciplinary interpretations, which may require further expansion within the framework of cultural or cognitive analysis. A promising direction for further research may be the analysis of the interaction of intuition and logical reason in applied fields – such as pedagogy, the ethics of artificial intelligence, and intercultural communication – with an emphasis on the transformation of cognitive models under conditions of globalisation.

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