PROBLEMA DETERMINISMULUI ÎN TEORIA EMOȚIILOR ȘI SENTIMENTELOR LA ROBERT C. SOLOMON

Abstract

Traditionally, emotions and feelings are seen in philosophy as inversely proportional to free will. A large “amount” of emotions and feelings is thought to diminish our voluntary autonomy. Robert C. Solomon considers this view to be mistaken. His hypothesis rests on the convergence between, on the one hand, emotions and feelings, and on the other hand, reason. The most comprehensive term Solomon uses to refer to emotions, feelings, or inner states (moods) is that of passion, which is not only a part of reason but also both a cause and an effect with respect to thinking, action, identity, and personal values. Passions are not a passive domain of the intellect; rather, they are intentions directed toward an object and are, moreover, “doings” as well as vital components of reason. Although they motivate the will to act hic et nunc, they are formed through past experience and remain continuously open to new valences. Emotions and feelings are forms of reasoning at our disposal for strengthening and shaping other forms of reasoning. Our study questions the extent to which Solomon’s theory is credible in dispelling the traditional prejudice and in rejecting determinism with regard to emotions and feelings. Thus, we will show that Solomon’s arguments are scientifically sound, coherent, and persuasive.